

The following is the syllabus for a joint masters and undergraduate course on the epistemology of testimony which I am currently teaching at UiO.

The Epistemology of Testimony

Teaching Method

The course is taught via weekly sessions of 1hr 45 mins in length. Each session is roughly divided in two, with the first half of the session being delivered as a lecture (with a large degree of student participation and discussion), and the second half being dedicated to focused small group discussion.

Assessment

Students submit two five page essays, one half way through the course, one at the end of the course. The questions for the first set of essays are as follows:

1. What is testimonial belief?
2. What lessons can we draw from the social psychological literature regarding our ability to distinguish good from bad testimony?
3. What is the most compelling argument for or against presumptivism? Can this argument be resisted?
4. What is the most compelling argument for or against non-presumptivism? Can this argument be resisted?
5. What is the most compelling argument for or against the assurance view of testimony? Can this argument be resisted?
6. Recently, several philosophers have proposed (in different ways) that our knowledge can be dependent not only on our own belief forming mechanisms, or the reliability of our informants, but also on wider social processes (for example, socially distributed cognition). Describe and critically assess one such 'anti-individualist' view.

Week 1: What is Testimonial Belief

Core reading: Shieber, J. 2015. *Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction*. Routledge. London. Ch 1.

Optional: Lackey, J. 2006. The Nature of Testimony. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 87. 177-197.

Optional: Graham, P. 2015. Testimony as Speech Act, Testimony as Source. In Chienkuo Mi, Ernest Sosa & Michael Slote (eds.), *Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn toward Virtue*. Routledge. pp. 121-144

Week 2: Social Psychology of testimony

Core reading: Shieber, J. 2015. *Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction*. Routledge. London. Ch 2.

Optional: Sperber, D. Clement, F. Heintz, C. Mascaro, O. Mercier, H. Origg, G. & Wilson, D. 2010. Epistemic Vigilance. *Mind and Language* 25 (4). 359-393.

Optional: Michaelian, K. 2013. The Evolution of Testimony: Receiver Vigilance, Speaker Honesty, and the Reliability of Communication. *Episteme* 10 (1). 37-59.

Optional: Sperber, D. 2013. Speakers are Honest because Hearers are Vigilant: A Response to Michaelian. *Episteme* 10 (1). 61-71.

Optional. Michaelson, E. Forthcoming. Lying, Testimony, and Epistemic Vigilance. From Jörg Meibauer (ed) *The Oxford handbook of Lying*.

Week 3: Non- Presumptivism

Core reading: Shieber, J. 2015. Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge. London. Ch 3.

Optional: Adler, J. 2006/2012. Epistemological Problems of Testimony. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Optional: Shogenji, T. 2006. A Defense of Reductionism about the Justification of Testimonial Beliefs. *Noûs* 40 (2). 331-346.

Optional: Kenyon, T. 2013. The Informational Richness of Testimonial Contexts. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 63 (250). 58-80.

Optional: Graham, P. 2018. Formulating Reductionism about Testimonial Warrant and the Challenge from Childhood Testimony. *Synthese* 195 (7). 3013-3033.

Week 4: Presumptivism

Core reading: Shieber, J. 2015. Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge. London. Ch 4.

Optional: Graham, P. Forthcoming. Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony: Burge on the A Priori Basis of Testimonial Entitlement. In E. Michaelson and A. Stokke (eds.) *Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Optional: Simion, M., Kelp, C. Forthcoming. How to be an Anti-Reductionist. *Synthese*.

Optional: Simion, M. Forthcoming. Testimonial Contractarianism. *Noûs*.

Week 5: The Assurance Theory

Core reading: Shieber, J. 2015. Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge. London. Ch 5 (up to but not including 5.7).

Optional: Moran, R. 2005. Getting Told and Being Believed. *Philosopher's Imprint* 5 (5). 1-29.

Optional: Keren, A. 2012. On the Alleged Perversity of the Evidential View of Testimony. *Analysis* 72 (4). 707.

Optional: Leonard, N. 2016. Testimony, Evidence, and Interpersonal Reasons. *Philosophical Studies* 173 (9). 2333-2352.

Optional: Owens, D. 2006. Testimony and Assertion. *Philosophical Studies* 130 (1). 105-129.

Week 6: Anti-Individualism

Core reading: Shieber, J. 2015. *Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction*. Routledge. London. Ch 6.

Optional: Lackey, J. 2005. Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70 (3). 636-658

Optional: Peet, A. Pitcovski, E. 2018. Normal Knowledge: Toward an explanation based theory of knowledge. *The Journal of Philosophy* 115 (3). 141-157.

Lackey, J. 2016. What is Justified Group Belief? *The Philosophical Review* 125 (3). 341-396.

Week 7: Transmission

Core reading: Wright, S. 2016. The transmission of Knowledge and Justification. *Synthese* 193 (1). 293-311.

Optional: Pelling, C. 2013. Testimony, Testimonial Belief, and Safety. *Philosophical Studies* 164. 205-218.

Optional: Fraser, R. 2016. Risk, Doubt, and Transmission. *Philosophical Studies* 173. 2803-2821.

Optional: MacFarlane, J. 2005. Knowledge Laundering: Testimony and Sensitive Invariantism. *Analysis* 65 (2). 132-138.

Optional: Leonard, N. The Transmission view of Testimony and the Problem of Conflicting Evidence. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 55 (1). 27-35.

Optional: Peet, A. Pitcovski, E. 2017. Lost in Transmission: Testimonial Justification and Practical Reason. *Analysis* 77 (2). 336-344.

Optional: Barnett, D.J. 2015. Is Memory Testimony from One's Former Self? *The Philosophical Review* 124 (3). 353-392.

Week 8: Credit for Testimonial Belief

Core reading: Lackey, J. 2006. Why we don't deserve credit for everything we know. *Synthese* 158 (3). 345-361.

Optional: Lackey, J. 2009. Knowledge and Credit. *Philosophical Studies* 142. 27-42.

Optional: Pritchard, D. 2012. Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. *The Journal of Philosophy* 109 (3). 247-279.

Optional: McMyler, B. 2012. Responsibility for Testimonial Belief. *Erkenntnis* 76. 337-352.

Week 9. Pragmatics, Communication, and Testimony

Core reading: Fricker, E. 2012. Stating and Insinuating. *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 86 (1). 61-94.

Optional: Hawthorne, J. 2012. Some Comments on Fricker's Stating and Insinuating. *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 86 (1). 95-108.

Optional: Camp, E. Forthcoming. Insinuation, Common Ground, and Conversational Record. In D. Fogal, D. Harris, and Mat Moss (eds.) *New Work on Speech Acts*. Oxford University Press.

Optional: Peet, A. 2016. Testimony and the Epistemic Uncertainty of Interpretation. *Philosophical Studies* 173. 395-416.

Week 10. Expert Testimony

Core reading: Goldman, A. 2001. Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 63 (1). 85-110.

Optional: Guerrero, A. Forthcoming. Living with Ignorance in a World of Experts. In R. Peels (ed) *Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy*. Routledge.

Week 11. Moral Testimony

Core reading: Hopkins, R. 2007. What is Wrong with Moral Testimony? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (3). 611-634.

Optional: Hills, A. 2009. Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology. *Ethics* 120 (1).94-127.

Optional: Sliwa, P. 2012. In Defense of Moral Testimony. *Philosophical Studies* 158. 175-195.

Week 12. Epistemic Injustice

Core reading: Fricker, M. 2007. *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chs 1 & 2 ('Testimonial Injustice' & 'Prejudice in the Credibility Economy').

Optional: Dotson, K. 2011. Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing. *Hypatia* 26 (2). 236-256.

Optional: Kukla, R. 2014. Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice. *Hypatia* 29 (2). 440-457.

Week 13. Group Testimony

Core reading: Lackey, J. 2014. A Deflationary Account of group testimony. From Lackey, J. (ed.) *Essays in Collective Epistemology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 64-97.

Optional: Fricker, M. 2012. Group Testimony? The Makings of a Good Collective Informant. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 84 (2). 249-276.

Optional: Faulkner, P. Collective Testimony, and Collective Knowledge. *Ergo* 5 (4). 103-126.

Week 14. Epistemic Coverage

Core reading: Goldberg, S. 2010. *Relying on Others: An Essay in Social Epistemology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch 6.

Optional: Goldberg, S. 2011. The Division of Epistemic Labor. *Episteme* 8 (1). 112-125.

Optional: Goldberg, S. 2017. Can Asserting that p Improve the Speaker's Epistemic Position (and is that a good thing?). *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 95 (1). 157-170.

This is a proposal for a 10 week seminar course in ethics, suitable for advanced undergraduates and masters students.

Knowledge, Ignorance, and Morality.

Course topic.

Knowledge, ignorance, and morality seem to be inextricably connected: knowledge of right and wrong seems central to our ability to act well. And ignorance, be it of morality, or the non-moral facts, seems to excuse us for wrongdoing. Yet the epistemic dimension of morality gives rise to a number of deep puzzles. For example, if ignorance excuses, and our ancestors believed slavery to be morally permissible, then how can we hold them responsible for the slave trade? Morally speaking, what should we do when we don't know what morality tells us to do? If we do the right thing without knowing that we are doing so, do we still deserve credit? Can we gain moral knowledge simply by taking another's word for it? And how can we trust our moral intuitions given that, had we evolved differently, we would have had an entirely different set of moral beliefs? We will grapple with these questions in this course. We will start, in the first half of the course by considering the moral significance of ignorance, uncertainty, and knowledge. We will then, in the second half of the course, consider a number of epistemic challenges for moral realism, focusing on the puzzle of moral testimony, and evolutionary debunking arguments.

Learning Outcomes

Upon completing the course students will be able to:

1. Understand and critically engage with work focusing on the moral and meta-ethical significance of ignorance, uncertainty, and knowledge.
2. Understand and critically engage with the central epistemic challenges to moral realism.
3. Display their understanding and ability to critically engage with these issues via their ability to write clearly and concisely on the topic.

Teaching Methods

The teaching will be conducted as a series of weekly seminars. Students will read the assigned papers and attend class with a short written statement of the core challenges they faced understanding and engaging with the text, and the core issues they found to be philosophically interesting or compelling in the text (with a brief explanation of why). This will serve as the basis for discussion.

Assessment Methods

Students will complete a single essay of around 4000 words in length.

Essay Questions

As this is an advanced course, students are encouraged to formulate their own essay questions, and discuss these with the course coordinator before proceeding. However, the following essay questions can be used as examples:

1. Can moral realists account for the strangeness of moral deference?
2. Could we avoid moral blameworthiness by cultivating ignorance?
3. Should moral uncertainty simply be treated as a form of descriptive uncertainty?
4. If I do the right thing despite believing that I am doing the wrong thing, do I still deserve credit?

Weekly Schedule

Week 1. When does ignorance excuse part 1:

Main reading: Holly Smith. 1983. Culpable ignorance. *The Philosophical Review* 92 (4). 543-571.

Optional: Gideon Rosen. 2008. Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility. *The Journal of Philosophy* 105-10. 591-610.

Week 2. When does ignorance excuse part 2:

Main reading: Gideon Rosen. 2003. Culpability and Ignorance. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 103. 61-84.

Optional: Gideon Rosen. 2004. Skepticism about Moral Responsibility. *Philosophical Perspectives* 18 (1). 295-313.

Optional: Elizabeth Harman. 2011. Does Moral Ignorance Expulcate? *Ratio* 24 (4). 443-468.

Week 3. Uncertainty about the facts:

Main reading: Frank Jackson and Michael Smith. 2006. Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty. *The Journal of Philosophy* 103 (6). 267-283.

Optional: Ron Aboudi, Adi Borer and David Enoch. 2008. Deontology, Individualism, and Uncertainty: A Reply to Jackson and Smith. *The Journal of Philosophy* 105 (5). 259-272.

Optional: Patrick Hawley. 2008. Moral Absolutism Defended. *The Journal of Philosophy* 105 (5). 273-275.

Optional: Yoav Isaacs. 2014. Duty and Knowledge. *Philosophical Perspectives* 28. 96-110.

Week 4. Uncertainty about Morality:

Main Reading: Elizabeth Harman. 2015. The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Optional: Andrew Sepielli. 2014. What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do When You Don't Know What to Do... *Noûs* 48 (3). 521-544.

Optional: Benjamin Kiesewetter. 2016. You ought to φ only if you may believe that you ought to φ . *Philosophical Quarterly* 66 (265). 760-782.

Week 5. Moral worth part 1:

Main Reading: Normy Arpaly. 2002. Moral Worth. *The Journal of Philosophy* 99 (5). 223-245.

Optional: Julia Markovits. 2010. Acting for the Right Reasons. *The Philosophical Review* 119 (2). 201-242.

Week 6. Moral worth part 2:

Main Reading: Paulina Sliwa. 2015. Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 93 (2). 393-418.

Optional: Zoe Johnson King. Forthcoming. Accidentally Doing the Right Thing. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

Week 7. Moral testimony - the case against:

Main Reading: Robert Hopkins. 2007. What is Wrong with Moral Testimony? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (3). 611-634.

Optional: Sarah McGrath. 2011. Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism. *The Journal of Philosophy* 108 (3). 111-137.

Week 8. Moral testimony - the case for:

Main Reading: David Enoch. 2014. A Defense of Moral Deference. *The Journal of Philosophy* 111 (5). 229-258.

Optional: Paulina Sliwa. 2012. In Defense of Moral Testimony. *Philosophical Studies* 158 (2). 175-195.

Week 9. Evolutionary debunking:

Main Reading: Sharon Street. 2006. A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value. *Philosophical Studies* 127 (1). 109-166.

Optional: Katia Vavova. 2014. Debunking Evolutionary Debunking. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Week 10. Evolutionary debunking and the Morality/Mathematics Analogy:

Main Reading: Justin Clarke-Doan. 2014. Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy. *Noûs* 48 (2). 238-255.

Optional: Jack Woods. 2018. Mathematics, Morality, and Self-Effacement. *Noûs* 52 (1). 47-68.

This is a proposal for an 11 week course on political philosophy of language, suitable for advanced undergraduates or masters students.

The Politics of Communication

Description

We normally think of communication as a cooperative endeavour: as a means for sharing knowledge and coordinating with others. However, language is also used as a means of oppression and degradation. Moreover, it is not clear that the epistemic resources communication makes available are fairly distributed. This course examines the more sinister side of language use, covering topics such as racial slurs, epistemic injustice, and silencing.

Required Text

Readings will be made available online.

The following texts will be useful:

Adam Jaworski & Nikolas Coupland – The Discourse Reader

Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever – Broken Language

Miranda Fricker – Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of Knowing

Schedule.

Week 1. Silencing and Pornography.

Readings:

- Rae Langton – Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts.
- Jennifer Saul – Pornography, Speech Acts, and Context.
- Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton – Free Speech and Illocution (Optional).
- J.L. Austin – How to Do things with Words (Extracts from Jaworski and Coupland)(Optional Background).

Week 2. Testimonial Injustice.

Readings:

- Miranda Fricker – Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of Knowing (ch 1 & 2).
- Ishani Maitra - The Nature of Epistemic Injustice (Optional).

Week 3. Responding to Testimonial Injustice.

Readings:

- Miranda Fricker – Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of Knowing (ch 3).
- Kristie Dotson – Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.
- Miranda Fricker – Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of Knowing (ch 4 & 5) (Optional).

Week 4. Hermeneutical Injustice.

Readings:

- Miranda Fricker – Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of Knowing (ch 7).
- Gaile Pohlhaus - Relational knowing and epistemic injustice: Toward a theory of wilful hermeneutical ignorance (Optional).

Week 5. Discursive and Interpretative Injustice.

Readings:

- Rebecca Kukla – Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice.
- Andrew Peet – Epistemic Injustice in Utterance Interpretation.
- Luvel Anderson – Hermeneutical Impasses (Optional).

Week 6. Generics and Generalization.

Readings:

- Sarah-Jane Leslie – The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization.
- Jennifer Saul – Are Generics Especially Pernicious.

Sarah-Jane Leslie - Hillary Clinton is the only man in the Obama Administration': Dual Character Concepts, Generics, and Gender (Optional).

- Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever – Broken Language: Non-Cooperative Language Use (ch 8) (Optional).

Week 7. Slurs and Epithets.

Readings:

- Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever – Broken Language: Non-Cooperative Language Use (ch 7).

- Luvell Anderson and Ernie Lepore – Slurring Words (Optional).

- Elizabeth Camp – Slurs as Dual-Act Expressions (Optional).

Week 8. Dog Whistles and Not at Issue Content.

Readings:

- Jennifer Saul – Dog Whistles, Political Manipulation, and Philosophy of Language.

- Jason Stanley – How Propaganda Works (ch 4).

- Justin Khoo – Code Words in Political Discourse (Optional).

Week 9. Responding to Problematic Speech.

Readings:

- Rae Langton – Blocking as Counter-Speech.

- Rae Langton – John Locke Lectures: Accommodating Injustice (Optional)(available at: <http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/john-locke-lectures#collapse1-2>).

Week 10. Changing Language.

Readings:

- Sally Haslanger – Gender and Race: (What) Are they? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?

- Derek Ball – Could Women be Analytically Oppressed?

- Jennifer Saul – The Philosophical Analysis of Social kinds: Gender and Race (Optional).

- Alexis Burges & David Plunkett – Conceptual Ethics 1 & 2 (Optional).

Week 11. Is Conceptual Engineering a Worthwhile Project?

Readings:

- Herman Cappelen – Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering (Sections 3 and 5).

- Patrick Greenough - Against Conceptual Engineering (Optional).

This is a proposal for a 10 week advanced introduction to epistemology course.

What is Knowledge?

Course Topic

Knowledge is special. When we have knowledge, rather than mere true belief, our representation of the world is anchored in reality, it is tied down to the world. Many philosophers consider knowledge to be the pinnacle of cognitive achievement. It plays an important role in our everyday lives, and that it is central to the goals of inquiry. Yet, our understanding of knowledge seems deeply flawed. Knowledge has, for a long time, resisted analysis. And it has a number of puzzling features: it seems clear that we can lose knowledge when presented with misleading evidence, it seems clear that if we know, then we must at least be in a position to know that we know, it seems clear that we can only know on the basis of good evidence, and it seems that if we know that p, and know that p entails q, then we should be in a position to know that q. Yet there appear to be good reasons to deny all these claims. They seem to conflict with fundamental facts about the nature of knowledge. This course focuses on contemporary philosophical research on the nature of knowledge. We will consider recent attempts to analyse knowledge, as well as sceptical doubts about the feasibility of such projects. And we will consider some of the most puzzling features of knowledge in the hopes of better understanding this crucially important, but deeply mystifying concept.

On completion of the module a student should be able to:

- Demonstrate knowledge and understanding of contemporary research on the nature of knowledge.
- Critically engage with contemporary work in this area.

Preferred Assessment Method

The preferred assessment method for this course is two 2000 word essays, one on topics from the first half of the course (the nature of knowledge), and one on topics from the latter half of the course (features of knowledge).

Course Content:

Part 1: The Nature of knowledge

1. Gettier

Edmund Gettier. 1963. Is Knowledge Justified True Belief? *Analysis* 23 (6). 121-123.
Linda Zagzebski. 1994. The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. *Philosophical Quarterly* 44 (174). 65-73.
Optional: Brian Weatherson. 2003. What Good are Counterexamples? *Philosophical Studies* 115 (1).

2. Reliabilism

Alvin Goldman. 1979. What is Justified Belief? in G.S. Pappas (ed.), *Justification and Knowledge*, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1–25
Laurence Bonjour. 1980. Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 5 (1).53-73.

3. Anti-Luck Epistemology & Virtue Reliabilism

Duncan Pritchard 2012. Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. *Journal of Philosophy* 109 (3). 247-279.
Optional: Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2018. Purifying Impure Virtue Epistemology. *Philosophical Studies* 175 (2). 385-410.
Optional: Andrew Peet and Eli Pitcovski. 2018. Normal Knowledge: Towards an explanation based view of knowledge. *Journal of Philosophy* 115 (3). 141-157.

4. Reasons and Defeaters

Mark Schroeder. 2015. Knowledge is Belief for Sufficient (Subjective and Objective) Reasons. In Hawthorne and Gendler (eds) *Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol 5*. Oxford University Press.
Optional: Errol Lord. Forthcoming. Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters. In Star (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*. Oxford University Press

5. Knowledge First epistemology.

Timothy Williamson. 1995. Is Knowing a State of Mind? *Mind* 104 (415). 533-565.
Jennifer Nagel. 2013. Knowledge as a Mental State. In J. Hawthorne and T. Gendler (eds.) *Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol 4*. Oxford University Press. 275-310.
Carrie Jenkins and Jonathan Ichikawa. 2017. On Putting Knowledge First'. In J. A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (ed.s) *Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind*, Oxford University Press. 113-131.

Part 2: Features of Knowledge

6. Knowledge Defeat

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio. 2010. Unreasonable Knowledge. *Philosophical Perspectives* 24 (1). 1-21.
Optional: Benton & Baker-Hyatt. 2015. Defeatism Defeated. *Philosophical Perspectives* 29 (1). 40-66.

7. Luminosity & KK

Amia Srinivasen. 2015. Are we Luminous. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 90 (2). 294-319.
Daniel Greco 2014. Could KK be OK? *The Journal of Philosophy* 111 (4). 169-197.

8. Closure

Fred Dretske. 2005. The Case Against Closure. In M. Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*. Malden, Ma: Blackwell.. 13--25
John Hawthorne 2005. The Case for Closure. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*. Blackwell. 26-43.
Optional: Jennifer Nagel. 2011. The Psychological basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. *Philosopher's Imprint* 11 (1). 1-28.
Optional: Maria Lasonen-Aarnio. 2008. Single Premise Deduction and Risk. *Philosophical Studies* 141 (2). 157-173.

9. Context Sensitivity

Keith DeRose. 1995. Solving the Skeptical Problem. *The Philosophical Review* 104 (1). 1-52.
Optional: Keith DeRose. 2002. Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. *The Philosophical Review* 111 (2). 167-203.

10. Pragmatic Encroachment

Jeremy Fantl and Matt McGrath. 2007. On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 75 (3). 558-589.
Optional: Blake Roeber. 2-16. The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate. *Noûs* 52 (1). 171-195.

The following is a proposal for an introductory epistemology course suitable for second year undergraduates.

Intro to Epistemology.

Description

Epistemology is the study of knowledge, justification, and related notions such as rationality and degrees of belief. We will begin by exploring two big problems in epistemology: The skeptical paradox, which appears to show that we have no knowledge, and the Gettier problem, which shows that our traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief is mistaken. We will then turn to a series of responses to these problems, which shed light on the nature of knowledge and justification. After considering the abstract nature of knowledge we will turn to the sources of knowledge. We will consider perception, testimony (spoken word), and finally philosophical intuition (the source we will have been relying on throughout the course). Upon completing this course you will be in a position to engage with more advanced and specialised topics in epistemology, and you will be in a position to begin to assess the very methodologies you employ whilst doing philosophy.

Schedule:

Week 1. Skepticism.

Readings:

Rene Descartes Meditation 1.

Barry Stroud - The Philosophical Significance of Scepticism (ch 1)

Week 2. Moorean Responses to Skepticism.

Readings:

G.E. Moore - Proof of an External World.

Jim Pryor - What is Wrong with Moore's Argument?

Week 3. The Analysis of Knowledge.

Readings:

Edmund Gettier - Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?

Linda Zagzebski - The Inescapability of Gettier Problems

Week 5. Contextualism.

Readings:

Keith De Rose - Solving the Skeptical Problem

David Lewis - Elusive Knowledge (Optional)

David Lewis - Scorekeeping in a Language Game (Optional)

Week 6. Reliabilism.

Readings:

Alvin Goldman - What is Justified Belief

Laurence Bonjour - Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge

Jonathan Vogel - Reliabilism Leveled (Optional)

Jennifer Nagel - Knowledge and Reliability (Optional)

Week 7. Safety and Sensitivity.

Readings:

Robert Nozick - Philosophical Explorations (Extracts).

Ernest Sosa - How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.

Week 8. Anti-Luck Epistemology: Challenges and Extensions.

Readings:

Duncan Pritchard - Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.

Thomas Bogardus - Knowledge Under Threat (Optional)

Week 9. The Epistemology of Perception

Readings:

Susanna Siegel and Nico Silins - The Epistemology of Perception.

Week 10. The Epistemology of Testimony

Readings:

Elizabeth Fricker - Against Gullibility

Jennifer Lackey - It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.

Week 11. The Epistemology of Philosophical Methodology

Readings:

Jennifer Nagel - Intuitions and Experiments: In Defence of the Case Method in Philosophy.

Introduction to the Philosophy of Language.

Description

This is an introductory course in the Philosophy of Language. The Philosophy of Language is an extremely broad field, and it would be impossible to provide a comprehensive overview in one course. For that reason we will be focusing primarily on the nature of language and its use. We will consider the nature of reference, meaning, and language, together with its different uses.

Prerequisites

This course is intended for second year undergraduate students. Students should have taken at least one introductory level general philosophy course, together with introductory logic.

Schedule.

Week 1. Reference and Meaning.

Readings:

Frege - On Sense and Reference.

Week 2. Reference and Description.

Readings:

Russell - On Denoting.

Strawson - On Referring.

Week 3. Kripke on Reference.

Readings:

Kripke - Naming and Necessity (Extracts)

Week 4. Reference and Semantic Externalism.

Readings:

Putnam - Meaning and Reference.

Wikforss - Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism (Optional)

Week 5. Grice on Meaning.

Readings:

Grice - Meaning.

Bar-On - "Meaning" Reconstructed: Grice and the Naturalising of Semantics (optional).

Week 6. Language and Convention.

Readings:

Lewis - Languages and Language

Hawthorne - A Note on 'Languages and Language' (Optional)

Week 7. Implicature

Readings:

Grice - Logic and Conversation

Saul - What is Said and Psychological Reality: Grice's Project and Relevance Theorists' Criticisms (Optional)

Week 8. Context Sensitivity

Readings:

Lewis – Scorekeeping in a Language Game.

Stalnaker - Assertion. (Optional)

Week 9. The Extent of Context Sensitivity.

Readings:

Bezuidenhout - Truth Conditional Pragmatics

Borg - Meaning and Context: A Survey of the Contemporary Debate. (Optional)

Week 10. Metaphor.

Readings:

Camp - Metaphor And That Certain 'Je Ne Sais Quoi'

Week 11. The Politics of Language Use

Readings:

Austin - Performative Speech Acts

Langton - Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts

Saul - Pornography, Speech Acts, and Context (Optional)