I am a postdoctoral research fellow in philosophy at the University of Oslo, affiliated with CSMN and ConceptLab. I completed my PhD at the University of St Andrews in 2015, where I was affiliated with the Arché Philosophical Research Centre. I was supervised by Herman Cappelen and Brian Weatherson, and my examiners were Lizzie Fricker and Patrick Greenough. Before that I completed my BA and MA in philosophy at the University of Leeds.
I currently have two main projects. The first focuses on communication, especially defective communication, the conditions for knowledge-yielding communication, and the nature of language. This work lies at the intersection of the philosophy of language and epistemology, although it also touches on issues in social philosophy and the philosophy of mind. My second project focuses on the nature of knowledge. In particular I am interested in epistemic luck, knowledge-how, and alternatives to process based views of knowledge.
I also have more general research interests in epistemology and the philosophy of language, together with particular topics in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind/psychology, the philosophy of action, and social philosophy. You can find my CV here.
In addition to my research activities I am currently co-organizing two conferences: 1) the first annual Social Epistemology Network Event with Mona Simion and Sandy Godlberg. 2) NYU/ConceptLab Foundations of Conceptual Engineering conference (with Vera Flocke, Herman Cappelen, and David Chalmers).
Outside of philosophy I enjoy spending time with my wife Lizzie, my (new) son Oliver, and my cat. I also enjoy climbing and other related physical activities.
'Testimonial Knowledge-How', forthcoming in Erkenntnis.
'Normal Knowledge: Toward an explanation based theory of knowledge' (with Eli Pitcovski), forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy.
'Lost in Transmission: Testimonial Justification and Practical Reason' (with Eli Pitcovski), Analysis, vol 77 issue 2, 2017.
'Etiology, Understanding, and Testimonial Belief', forthcoming in Synthese.
'Referential Intentions and Communicative Luck', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol 95, issue 2, 2017.
'Epistemic Injustice in Utterance Interpretation', Synthese, vol 194, issue 9, 2017.
'Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of What is Said', forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
'Testimony and the Epistemic Uncertainty of Interpretation', Philosophical Studies, vol 173, issue 2, 2016.
'Testimony, Pragmatics, and Plausible Deniability', Episteme, vol 12, issue 1, 2015.
I do not list work under review or in progress to allow for anonymous review.
Email: andrewpeet123 at gmail.com
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